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Abstract:  This paper offers a comprehensive econometric investigation of the impact of income 
inequality on the values endorsed by people. Using survey data from all thirty-four OECD 
countries over a period of almost thirty years, the following dimensions of value systems are 
investigated: work ethic, civism, obedience, honesty, altruism, and tolerance. In most cases, no 
robust effects from inequality on values are detected. However, there is evidence that a more 
unequal income distribution strengthens the work ethic of the population. Thus, income 
inequality seems to generate work incentives not only via the pecuniary reward of work but 
also through the symbolic reward it receives.  
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1. Introduction 
A strand of empirical literature has documented the association of income inequality with 
a number of outcomes, including well-being, health, trust, and crime - often arguing that 
income inequality causes those outcomes to worsen.1 Income inequality may affect outcomes 
through two main channels. First, the distribution of income determines the budget sets faced 
by households and hence the range of options and outcomes that are available to them. 
Second, the effect from inequality may be mediated by various forms of cultural change. In 
particular, income inequality may shape the values and norms endorsed by people, which in 
turn influence their behavior. This paper explores the link between income inequality and 
self-reported values. It shows that that relationship differs according to the specific values one 
considers: income inequality cannot significantly explain the observed variation in endorsed 
values in several cases, but there are exceptions where inequality matters.  
Being self-reliant, always telling the truth, and donating to the needy are examples of 
behavior that carries a symbolic value: self-respect and the respect gained from others depend 
on those ways of behaving.  But this does not apply to everybody to the same extent because 
people endorse different values. Psychology, anthropology and sociology have since long 
investigated the variability of values and norms - both within and across societies. For 
example, Inglehart and Baker (2000) recently argued that developed countries after World 
War II experienced a transition from “traditional” to “modern” values. 
Values affect people’s choices and welfare through an individual and a social channel. 
The individual channel is the unpleasant feeling of guilt that one has if one’s behavior violates 
one’s own moral standards and the symmetric pride if one behaves in line with internalized 
values. The social channel refers to the esteem received from relevant others – family, 
colleagues, neighbors, etc. - which in turn depends on those others’ value systems: one gains 
approval by conforming to others’ values, while contempt is received if one’s behavior 
contradicts them. As stressed by a burgeoning literature in economics, values can contribute 
to explain a wide range of economic phenomena, from long-run growth to occupational 
choice, from the internal organization of firms to labor market institutions.2 In view of the 
recent rise of income inequality in many parts of the world, understanding the impact of 
inequality on values may thus help to better predict those phenomena.3  
                                                 
1 Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) offer a stimulating overview. 
2 See e.g. Algan and Cahuc (2009), Auriol and Renault (2008), Corneo and Jeanne (2010), Doepke and Zilibotti 
(2008) and Tabellini (2008), as well as the discussion by Fehr and Hoff (2011). 
3 Recent trends of income inequality are documented in a cross-country perspective in OECD (2008, 2011). On 
global inequality, see Milanovic (2012). 
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This paper systematically explores multi-country data on self-reported values over a time 
horizon of almost three decades and relates value change to changes in income inequality. The 
following six dimensions of value systems are investigated: work ethic, civism, obedience, 
honesty, altruism, and tolerance. Each of those dimensions is likely to generate incentive 
effects in important areas of economic, social, and political behavior. For instance, work ethic 
is bound to affect households’ labor supply, while civism is a likely determinant of tax 
compliance. 
In the next section, we develop a simple theoretical framework that exhibits a channel 
through which income inequality can affect value formation in a causal sense. That 
framework is based on the hypothesis of purposive value formation, a hypothesis pioneered in 
economics by Akerlof (1983). The particular approach we follow is the one developed by 
Corneo and Jeanne (2009, 2010). An individual’s value system is defined as a mapping that 
determines an individual’s self-esteem and how she judge others; parents are assumed to 
choose value systems so as to maximize their children’s expected utility.4 The theoretical 
framework proposed in the next section does not yield implications that are sufficiently sharp 
to be tested; however, it is useful in order to show the potential role of income inequality on 
values in a transparent way. 
In Section 3, the data sources for the subsequent analysis are described. We deal with the 
estimation strategy in Section 4. The core of the paper is from Section 5 to Section 10, where 
six dimensions of value systems are investigated. Each of those sections builds around a set of 
regressions relating each single dimension of value systems to two measures of income 
inequality: current inequality and experienced inequality. Estimation results are discussed 
separately for each dimension of value systems.  
The final Section 11 summarizes our result and draws some conclusions. We find that 
income inequality has no robust effects on civic virtues, obedience, honesty and altruism. 
There is some evidence that more income inequality decreases tolerance, but that evidence is 
rather weak. The only robust effect we find is about the work ethic: a more unequal income 
distribution tends to strengthen the work ethic of the population. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Another possibility would be to follow Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001), who model both the transmission of 
cultural traits from parents to children and the influence of horizontal socialization. Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 
2005) employ a related notion of identity, which they consider to be partly malleable. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
In order to illustrate how income inequality may matter for value formation, we employ 
the theory of symbolic values developed by Corneo and Jeanne (2009, 2010). In that 
approach, a value system is a mapping from a set of judgeable types onto the real orthant. Let 
},..1{ Θ∈θ  denote a, possibly multidimensional, type and 0≥θv  denote its symbolic value. 
As values are intrinsically relative, use the normalization 1=∑ θv , i.e. let any individual’s 
value system Θ= ,...1}{ θθv  belong to the 1−Θ -simplex. Each value system is supposed to be 
chosen by the individual’s parents so as to maximize an objective function, e.g. their child’s 
expected utility. Values matter to individuals because they affect the esteem they receive from 
others as well as their self-esteem. An individual’s self-esteem is the value of her type 
according to her value system. Esteem received from others depends on others’ values about 
one’s type. 
The simplest case to handle is the one where parents are altruistic and the individuals’ 
types are exogenous but unknown at the time values are instilled. We focus on that case since 
it is sufficient in order to illustrate how income inequality may affect values. 
Posit a parents’ generation that chooses values for their children and a children’s 
generation that will experience some income inequality in adulthood. Every generation 
consists of a continuum of individuals and every parent has one offspring. Parents know their 
own income and correctly anticipate what the income distribution will be for the next 
generation but are uncertain about their children’s income. There are Z possible income 
levels, denoted by zy . The income distribution is described by the shares of population that 
receive the various income levels. Let the children’s income distribution be given by the 
shares )( zyf , with 1=∑ f . 
Every parent selects her child’s values so as to maximize the utility that the child is 
expected to derive from self-esteem, which is assumed to be separable from the remaining 
arguments in the utility function. We denote utility from self-esteem by )( tvu , where tv is the 
value of the child’s type t according to the child’s value system and ''0' uu >> . 
Denote by )(θπ the subjective probability of type θ . Parents solve the problem 
∑
Θ
=1
)()(max
θ
θθπ vu . 
subject to 
1
1
=∑
Θ
=θ
θv , 
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0≥θv . 
From the usual Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the optimal value system is characterized by 
λθπ θ =)(')( vu  if 0>θv  
λθπ θ ≤)(')( vu  if 0=θv , 
for some Lagrange multiplier λ . 
The notion that income inequality can affect values depends on the income level 
containing some information about the individual’s type. Denote the conditional distribution 
of children’s types by 
)|Pr()( zz yyp == θθ , 
where 1)( =∑θ θzp  for each z. The effect from inequality hinges on parents’ ability to 
forecast their children’s income, something which can be apprehended in terms of 
intergenerational income mobility. Two polar cases may be examined: a perfectly mobile 
society and a perfectly immobile society. 
In a perfectly mobile society, parents’ incomes contain no information about their 
children’s incomes. Every child has the same probability to receive a given income level as 
everybody else and that probability equals the fraction of the children’s generation that 
receives that income ex post. Thus, ∑= z zz pyf )()()( θθπ  and children’s expected utility 
from self-esteem reads 
)()()(
1 1
θ
θ
θ vupyfU
Z
z
zz∑∑
=
Θ
=
= . 
The optimality conditions of parents’ optimization problem can then be written as 
λθ θ =∑
=
Z
z
zz vupyf
1
)(')()(  if 0>θv  
λθ θ ≤∑
=
Z
z
zz vupyf
1
)(')()(  if 0=θv  
which immediately show that the shape of the income distribution, as given by the )( zyf s, 
generally influences value systems. Income inequality has no impact on values if and only if it 
contains no information about types, i.e. )()( θθ ppz =  for all z and all θ . 
Let us turn to the opposite case of perfect immobility, where a parent’s income class z is 
transmitted to her child with certainty. In this case, the child’s expected utility reads 
)()(
1
θ
θ
θ vupU z∑
Θ
=
= . 
In contrast to the former case, income inequality plays no role in shaping the value systems. 
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In the general case, intergenerational income mobility may be possible but less than 
perfect, and be described by a transition matrix. Income inequality will play a role in shaping 
values and one could investigate how various indexes of income inequality impinge upon 
values, contingent on the degree of intergenerational income mobility. 
To close this modelling part, briefly consider the determination of values in case of 
logarithmic utility: θθ vvu ln)( = . In this case, as soon as 0)( >θπ , optimal values have 
0>θv . Straightforward manipulations of the FOCs yield 
)(θπθ =v  θ∀ . 
Notice that the child’s indirect utility amounts to )(ln)( θπθπ
θ∑ . In case of perfect 
information, the parent would invest all value in the child’s type and the child’s utility would 
be 0. The utility increase generated by information about type is thus 
∑
Θ
=
−=
1
)(ln)(
θ
θπθπH , 
which is the amount of information about the state of the world according to Shannon. 
 
3. Data 
Information on the values endorsed by individuals is obtained from the European Value 
Studies and the World Values Survey, together referred to as WVS. The World Values Survey 
Network provides a harmonized file of European and World Values Surveys, extending over 
five survey waves carried out around 1981, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005.5 In addition, the 
European Values Survey 2008 provides a sixth round of survey data.6 In each wave, the entire 
survey project was conducted over a period of about three years and for each country the year 
when the survey was actually conducted is known. That year is used in the regressions 
discussed in this paper: directly, as a control for time fixed effects, and indirectly, since 
income inequality and other macroeconomic variables in the country of the respondent are 
taken for the year when the survey was actually conducted. The empirical analysis is 
restricted to OECD countries in order to reduce problems of data quality and comparability. 
As a result, the WVS sample analyzed in this paper covers about 190,000 individuals 
surveyed during a period of 29 years in 34 countries. 
From the WVS data, we recover individually endorsed values pertaining to the following 
six domains: work ethic, civism, obedience, honesty, altruism, tolerance. Each dimension of 
                                                 
5 For details see http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org. 
6 For details see http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu. 
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an individual’s value system is measured by means of responses given to one or more survey 
questions. Average reported values by country and wave are shown in the Appendix A. 
Income inequality in a given country and year is measured by the corresponding Gini 
coefficient. That variable is taken from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database 
(SWIID).7 The SWIID improves upon older collections of international income inequality 
datasets, like Deininger and Squire (1996) and the World Income Inequality Database from 
UN-WIDER and aims at minimizing problems associated with secondary data on income 
inequality as discussed by Atkinson and Brandolini (2001). The benchmark for 
standardization is the Luxembourg Income Study dataset which uses household adult-
equivalent income. Accordingly, the measure of inequality used throughout this paper is the 
Gini coefficient of household adult-equivalent net income. The Gini coefficients of net 
income for all OECD countries with corresponding observations in the WVS are shown in 
Appendix B.  
Information about country-level macro variables is obtained from the OECD and the 
World Bank. Since those two sources use slightly different definitions for some variables, 
estimations were conducted separately with macro data from the OECD and the World Bank, 
with both datasets being compiled in 2011. Since the estimation results concerning income 
inequality are very similar, we only present those obtained using the OECD data. 
 
4. Estimation Strategy 
The effect of income inequality on endorsed values is estimated using a set of stepwise 
richer models. A set of six models is called a configuration. A basic configuration is 
progressively augmented in order to enlarge the analysis and examine the robustness of 
results. 
For binary dependent variables, we estimate logit models. If dependent variables have an 
ordinal coding, ordered logit estimations are conducted.8 The models in what we refer to as 
the basic (B) configuration can be summarized by:  
ictictcctict XGiniV ελγβα ++++= '
*  
)0Pr()1Pr( * >== ictict VV  
The value V endorsed by individual i at time t in country c is explained by the Gini 
coefficient at time t in country c, a set of individual control variables X and country fixed 
                                                 
7 The construction of the SWIID is explained in Solt (2009). 
8 We also ran OLS regressions, which delivered very similar results. They can be obtained from the authors upon 
request. 
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effects. To control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries and idiosyncrasies due to the 
way in which survey questions are translated in the various languages, country dummies are 
included in all estimations. As shown by Moulton (1990), the inclusion of macro variables in 
the estimation of micro data can bias standard errors. Accordingly, all standard errors are 
corrected for clustering at the country level. 
The six models in the basic configuration become stepwise richer by including more 
regressors into X. In model (1), vector X only includes gender, age, and age squared, which 
are all unambiguously exogenous traits. Further models insert additional individual controls 
for which a mutual influence with the values endorsed by the individual cannot a priori be 
excluded. By including more regressors, the number of observations used in the regressions is 
typically reduced because of individually missing items or because some surveys did not 
collect the corresponding information. In model (2), also the educational achievements of 
respondents are included. Model (3) adds dummies for quintiles of a respondent’s household 
income. In model (4), dummies for family status and status in the labor market are included. 
Model (5) adds dummies for the frequency of attendance to religious services, which are 
substituted in model (6) with dummies for town size. All control variables are described in 
some detail in Appendix C. 
The six models of the basic configuration do not control for macroeconomic variables. 
Augmenting those models with controls for the log of real per capita GDP, the unemployment 
rate, and the real growth rate of GDP yields the B + Macro (M) configuration. Per capita 
GDP captures the aggregate level of economic prosperity in the respondent’s country; the 
unemployment rate is a basic indicator of inefficiency in the allocation of human resources; 
the growth rate of GDP in the year the survey was conducted captures the position of the 
country in the business cycle.9 
Neither the basic configuration nor the basic configuration with macro controls includes 
time dummies. The measured impact of inequality thus refers to the effect of inequality 
changes over time. The final configuration, which is called the B + M + Year FE 
configuration, controls instead also for the year in which the survey was conducted. Since 
country effects are always included, the estimated effect from income inequality in this 
configuration is merely due to the variation of the intertemporal changes of the country-
specific Gini coefficients. 
We investigate the effects on values from two dimensions of income inequality. First, we 
use the contemporaneous Gini coefficient and explore the relationship between values 
                                                 
9 Summary statistics for macro variables are also presented in Appendix C. 
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expressed in a given country in a given year and the income inequality observed in the same 
country in the same year. Contemporaneous inequality might affect values if it was expected 
in the past by parents when they raised their children. Second, we replace the 
contemporaneous Gini coefficient by the average Gini coefficient when the respondent was 
young, i.e. aged eighteen to twenty-five. This is based on the idea that experiences during that 
period of life exert an especially strong influence on future attitudes of individuals.10  
 
5. Work Ethic 
A prominent dimension of value systems concerns an individual’s work ethic, understood 
as the symbolic value that an individual attaches to being engaged in the production of goods 
and services, independently of the utility derived from the monetary remuneration and the 
concrete conditions under which the work is performed. Against the background of history, 
work ethic in the above sense seems to be a relatively recent phenomenon. According to the 
Bible, work was a curse devised by God to punish Adam and Eve for their original sin. Also 
the slave societies of the Greek polis and ancient Rome regarded work as an inferior activity. 
Medieval aristocracy used the clergy to try to convince their peasants that work was peasants’ 
duty as decreed by God. The rise of the modern work ethic is usually associated with the 
development of early capitalism and Protestantism. 
At first glance, the implications of a rigid work ethic for economic performance are 
straightforward. Ceteris paribus, a stronger work ethic will cause individuals to devote a 
larger share of their time and energy to work, thereby increasing labor supply and output. 
People looking for a job will do it more intensely if they have a stronger work ethic and they 
will be less choosy when the available jobs are badly paid; hence, a stronger work ethic will 
tend to lower the labor costs of firms and reduce the rate of unemployment. On second 
reflection, the impact of the work ethic on the macroeconomy appears more complex. A too 
strong work ethic could be harmful for economic growth in advanced knowledge-based 
economies that rely on human development and an efficient allocation of talent. Obsessions to 
have a job may lead individuals to avoid risk taking in the choice of their career, possibly 
sacrificing their personal talent for an occupation if the risk of personal failure is 
comparatively large. A very strong emphasis on work may be harmful for innovation if some 
“creative idleness” is a fertile soil for the arrival of new ideas. And compulsive workers may 
                                                 
10  See e.g. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) and references therein. We also conducted estimations using the 
Gini coefficient with a ten-year lag and with a twenty-year lag. Results can be obtained from the authors upon 
request. 
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turn out to be more likely to suffer from job-related health problems – from exhaustion to 
high blood pressure - that eventually undermine their ability to work. For society at large, a 
heavy stigmatization of the unemployed may prove highly divisive, politically destabilizing 
and costly in terms of social policy. Altogether, this suggests that the work ethic might have a 
non-monotonic effect on economic performance, improving it at low levels of work ethic and 
worsening it at high levels.11  
5.1. Work-first 
We use four survey questions from the WVS that proxy an individual’s work ethic. The 
first proxy is called work-first, and is constructed from a survey question where respondents 
are asked: 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Work should  always  come  
first,  even  if  it  means  less  spare  time. 5 ’Strongly agree’ 4 ’Agree’ 3 ’Neither 
agree or disagree’ 2 ’Disagree’ 1 ’Strongly disagree’  
 
Arguably, work-first is a good proxy for the work ethic because it directly evaluates whether 
and to what degree respondents prioritize work over other activities.12 Figure 1 plots the 
average numerical value taken by work-first in the various countries during the entire 
observation period against the country-specific average of the Gini coefficients in the 
corresponding years.13 The OLS regression line depicted in the figure indicates that income 
inequality and this proxy of the work-ethic are positively correlated across countries. 
 
Figure 1. Income inequality and work-first across OECD-countries.  
 
                                                 
11 Corneo (2012) offers some empirical evidence supporting this. 
12 Gradstein (2009) and Schaltegger and Torgler (2009) use this item to proxy for work attitudes. 
13 All scatter plots in this paper are constructed likewise.  
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Do changes in income inequality within countries contribute to explain country-specific 
changes in the work ethic of respondents, as measured by work-first? We follow the empirical 
strategy presented in Section 4. Since it entails a very large number of regressions, we only 
report the estimated coefficients for income inequality. We start with results for the 
contemporaneous Gini coefficient of net incomes. As can be seen from Table 1, income 
inequality has a positive, strongly significant relation with work-first when macroeconomic 
controls are excluded (basic configuration, first row). When controlling for the level of 
economic development, unemployment and yearly GDP growth (second row), results remain 
uniformly positive and highly significant. Adding time fixed effects (third row) yields positive 
coefficients, most of them statistically significant at levels of 5-10%. These results clearly 
suggest that income inequality strengthens the work ethic endorsed by individuals. 
 
Table 1. Coefficients of contemporaneous Gini for work-first  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic 0.064*** 0.086*** 0.088*** 0.090*** 0.088*** 0.089*** 
 (3.79) (4.29) (5.08) (5.15) (4.84) (4.76) 
B + Macro 0.064* 0.093*** 0.099*** 0.101*** 0.099*** 0.106*** 
 (2.41) (3.78) (4.25) (4.28) (4.13) (4.34) 
B + M + Year FE 0.045 0.063* 0.075* 0.077* 0.073+ 0.049 
 (1.28) (2.07) (1.96) (1.97) (1.85) (0.82) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
We now turn to the effect on work ethic generated by income inequality experienced 
during youth. As shown in Table 2, the effect from that variable on work-first is uniformly 
positive. However, results are not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
 
Table 2. Coefficients of Gini when aged 18-25 for work-first  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 
 (0.97) (0.58) (0.53) (0.55) (0.66) (0.56) 
B + Macro 0.013 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 
 (1.50) (0.81) (0.84) (0.85) (0.83) (0.86) 
B + M + Year FE 0.013 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 
 (1.57) (0.82) (0.88) (0.89) (0.87) (0.82) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
5.2. Money-work 
The second proxy for the work ethic of respondents is a variable that we label money-
work. It is based on the following survey question: 
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Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? It is humiliating to receive 
money without having to work for it. 5 ’Strongly agree’ 4 ’Agree’ 3 ’Neither agree nor 
disagree’ 2 ’Disagree’ 1 ’Strongly disagree’. 
 
Respondents who agree with this statement are likely to feel ashamed or guilty when being 
unemployed and to stigmatize those who live on unemployment benefits or related social 
transfers. This proxy captures the endorsement of a work norm that dictates self-
supportiveness, i.e. persons who are able to work should work so as to support themselves by 
their own work.14 Figure 2 depicts the correlation of money-work with the Gini coefficient of 
net incomes across countries. 
 
Figure 2. Income inequality and money-work across OECD-countries. 
 
 
The results from our empirical investigation are shown in Table 3. Accordingly, the 
contemporaneous Gini coefficient of net income has a positive relation with money-work, 
significant at levels of 5% to 10%.  
 
Table 3. Coefficients of contemporaneous Gini for money-work. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic 0.053* 0.059* 0.058* 0.061* 0.060* 0.064* 
 (2.19) (2.30) (2.29) (2.38) (2.28) (2.46) 
B + Macro 0.056+ 0.064* 0.062* 0.065* 0.063* 0.069* 
 (1.91) (2.18) (2.09) (2.13) (2.05) (2.37) 
B + M + Year FE 0.043+ 0.049* 0.046+ 0.048* 0.045+ 0.025 
 (1.94) (2.19) (1.95) (1.97) (1.88) (0.70) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
                                                 
14 Minkov and Blagoev (2009) use this item in a factor analysis to study the relation between culture and 
economic growth. 
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We now turn to the effect of inequality when respondents were aged eighteen to twenty-
five. As shown in Table 4, the experience of inequality when young has a positive effect on 
money-work, but results fail to be statistically significant. 
 
Table 4. Coefficients of Gini when aged 18-25 for money-work. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.005 
 (0.82) (0.86) (0.57) (0.67) (0.95) (0.69) 
B + Macro 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 
 (0.66) (0.59) (0.32) (0.41) (0.40) (0.13) 
B + M + Year FE 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.59) (0.48) (0.22) (0.31) (0.31) (0.09) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Taken all together, results obtained using money-work are remarkably similar to those 
obtained using work-first. By and large, more income inequality in a country comes with a 
higher probability that respondents in that country exhibit a stronger work ethic.  
 
5.3. Work-duty 
The third proxy constructed to capture a respondent’s work ethic asks whether work is a 
duty towards society: 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Work is a duty towards 
society 5 ’Strongly agree’ 4 ’Agree’ 3 ’Neither agree or disagree’ 2 ’Disagree’ 1 
’Strongly disagree’ 
 
It is not so clear that this survey question is a good proxy for work ethic as defined above, i.e. 
the value associated with actively contributing to the production of goods and services for 
one’s employer or the market. An individual may have a strong work ethic in this sense 
without being convinced that work is a duty towards society. That individual may think that 
work is a duty towards God or towards his family but not towards society. Conversely, 
someone with a weak work ethic in the above sense may agree that work is a duty towards 
society and therefore engage in a lot of volunteering to help the needy or to preserve the 
natural environment for future generations.15 The observed association between average 
work-duty and the Gini coefficient of net incomes across countries is shown in Figure 3. 
                                                 
15 In fact, Balan and Knack (2011) use work-duty as a proxy for morality in an analysis of the determinants of 
human capital investment. 
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Figure 3. Income inequality and work-duty across OECD-countries. 
 
 
Table 5 reports our estimation results concerning the effect from contemporaneous levels 
of inequality of net income. The estimated coefficients are mostly positive and often 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 5. Coefficients of contemporaneous Gini for work-duty. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic 0.060** 0.070** 0.068** 0.071* 0.068* 0.069* 
 (3.02) (2.81) (2.60) (2.57) (2.29) (2.33) 
B + Macro 0.071*** 0.084*** 0.080*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 0.084*** 
 (4.75) (4.81) (4.03) (3.84) (3.44) (3.51) 
B + M + Year FE 0.058* 0.065* 0.024 0.025 0.019 -0.013 
 (2.24) (2.39) (0.98) (0.97) (0.72) (-0.32) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The average level of income inequality experienced by respondents when aged eighteen 
to twenty-five also produces positive coefficients, see Table 6; however they lack statistical 
significance. 
Table 6. Coefficients of Gini when aged 18-25 for work-duty. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.007 
 (1.21) (1.15) (1.01) (1.07) (1.14) (0.98) 
B + Macro 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 
 (1.39) (1.17) (1.13) (1.21) (1.13) (1.12) 
B + M + Year FE 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 
 (1.45) (1.21) (1.22) (1.31) (1.23) (1.06) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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5.4. Child-hardwork 
A final proxy for the work ethic is the variable child-hardwork, a binary variable 
indicating whether respondents think that teaching children to work hard is important. 16 Hard 
work is an element in a list of eleven qualities from which respondents can choose up to five. 
The corresponding survey question reads: 
 
Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if 
any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five.  
Hard Work; 0 ’Not mentioned’ 1 ’Important’. 
 
A few caveats are in order. While it is likely that respondents with a stronger work ethic 
mention hard work as an important quality, this is by no mean obvious. Respondents with a 
strong work ethic may reason that their children should not be encouraged to learn the 
importance of hard work because children will live in a society where hard work does not pay 
in monetary terms. Conversely, an individual who personally disvalues hard work may want 
children to have a strong work ethic because hard work will be necessary in order for them to 
have economic success – and, possibly, because this raises the probability for the respondent 
to be helped by his children once they are adults. This survey item might then be seen as a 
proxy for the work ethic of the respondents’ children rather than of the respondents 
themselves. Another source of ambiguity is the reference to the home as to the place where a 
particular quality can be learnt. Additionally to the family, children may learn values from 
their peers, at school, in the church, and so on. Thus, two individuals who want their children 
to have the same value system may react in different ways to that survey question because 
their children face different social environments. By way of an example, a parent with a 
strong work ethic may fail to mention hard work in that survey question if her children are 
already taught work diligence by their teachers in school. Figure 4 depicts average work-ethic 
constructed from the considered variable and income inequality across countries. 
 
 
                                                 
16 This empirical measure of work ethic has also been used by Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) and Maystre et al. 
(2009). 
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Figure 4. Income inequality and child-hardwork across OECD-countries. 
 
 
When estimating the effect from contemporary inequality levels, we find a positive 
relation for all specifications, see Table 7. Most estimates are statistically significant at 
conventional levels.17  
 
Table 7. Coefficients of contemporaneous Gini for child-hardwork. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic 0.066+ 0.072* 0.064* 0.079** 0.077** 0.099 
 (1.90) (2.21) (2.48) (3.10) (3.00) (1.56) 
B + Macro 0.071* 0.072* 0.067* 0.071+ 0.069+ 0.089* 
 (2.49) (2.01) (2.27) (1.93) (1.90) (2.09) 
B + M + Year FE 0.075** 0.082* 0.086** 0.082** 0.080** 0.063 
 (2.69) (2.28) (2.80) (2.72) (2.82) (1.29) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
We now turn to the effect on the work ethic generated by inequality experienced during 
youth. As shown by Table 8, the mean value of income inequality when agents have been 
aged eighteen to twenty-five has a positive relation with child-hardwork, with most 
coefficients being statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 The reported results were derived from estimations that exclude Hungary and Poland. As can be seen from 
Table C4 in the Appendix, data from those two countries exhibits a very erratic behavior, depending on whether 
the European Values Survey or the World Values Survey is the data source, as they worded the question 
differently. Including Hungary and Poland in the regressions reduces the level of statistical significance of the 
coefficient of interest but does not change its sign. 
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Table 8. Coefficients of Gini when aged 18-25 for child-hardwork. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic 0.016 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.008 
 (1.62) (0.57) (1.01) (0.89) (0.69) (1.15) 
B + Macro 0.019*** 0.010+ 0.014** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012* 
 (3.32) (1.91) (3.00) (2.71) (2.59) (2.35) 
B + M + Year FE 0.021*** 0.009 0.013* 0.012* 0.011* 0.011+ 
 (4.16) (1.60) (2.56) (2.42) (2.30) (1.90) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
All in all, the analysis in this section delivers quite strong evidence in support of a 
positive effect from inequality of net incomes on the work ethic endorsed by the population. 
We have found that inequality during the same year definitively has a positive effect on the 
work ethic reported by individuals. Income inequality at the time the respondent was young 
has often been found to be positively correlated with the work ethic, but the effect is often not 
significant. We discuss the implications of those findings in the final Section 11. 
 
6. Civism 
Civism refers to that part of an individual’s value system that evaluates behavior towards 
the polity. It shapes attitudes about complying with rules and laws independently of their 
enforcement through police and tribunals. Civic virtues include paying taxes, rejecting bribes, 
testifying before courts, and voting on political elections. 
As a general presumption, stronger civic virtues are thought to favor macroeconomic 
performance since more cooperation obtains at lower social costs. In this vein, Guiso et al. 
(2010) propose a concept of civic capital and argue that civic capital can explain persisting 
differences in economic performance across countries. However, the notion that civic values 
are good for the economy does not go completely undisputed. Paying bribes to avoid a queue 
can increase overall efficiency by having those with the highest opportunity cost of time being 
served first. In Leviathan or predatory states, tax evasion can be necessary for economic 
initiative to flourish. Moreover, the public institutions that emerge in a country are themselves 
likely to be the result of the values endorsed by its citizens. Supporting this, Algan and Cahuc 
(2009) show that countries with stronger civic values tend to have more generous 
unemployment benefits and less strict regulations for job protection. 
From the WVS one can construct four proxies for civic values that emphasize various 
aspects of those values. All are used in the subsequent investigation of the effect of income 
inequality on civism. Each item refers to the justifiability of a specific behavior towards the 
polity.  
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Their common part reads: 
 
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be 
justified (1), never be justified (10), or something in between, using this card. 
 
The single statements are: 
Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled to. 
Avoiding a fare on public transport.  
Cheating on taxes if you have a chance. 
Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties. 
 
These items will now be investigated in turn.18 
6.1. Justify-govbenefit 
Let civism be measured by the respondent’s attitude towards the justifiability of claiming 
government benefits to which he is not entitled to. Notice that a higher number in the scale 
from 1 to 10 indicates a stronger civic value. The observed combination of average benefit 
moral and the inequality of incomes across countries is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Income inequality and justify-govbenefit across OECD-countries. 
 
 
                                                 
18 Knack and Keefer (1997) used cheating on benefits, on taxes and on fares and other variables to construct a 
measure of civic cooperation to proxy for social capital. Östling (2009) uses those items to proxy for moral 
values. Other papers that employed those items are Halla et al. (2010), Heinemann (2008), Schneider and 
Torgler (2006) and You and Khagram (2005). 
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As shown in Table 9, current income inequality generates no statistically significant 
impact on benefit morale within countries. 
 
Table 9. Coefficients of contemporaneous Gini for justify-govbenefit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic -0.013 0.031 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.021 
 (-0.63) (1.04) (1.24) (1.17) (1.15) (0.56) 
B + Macro -0.001 0.007 0.015 0.010 0.009 0.008 
 (-0.07) (0.35) (0.87) (0.52) (0.44) (0.37) 
B + M + Year FE -0.020 0.031 0.034 0.036 0.034 0.015 
 (-1.61) (1.50) (1.62) (1.60) (1.49) (0.55) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Results differ if one concentrates on the effect from inequality when aged eighteen to 
twenty-five (Table 10). In that case, more inequality is found to be harmful for civism and the 
effect is statistically significant in about one half of the regressions. 
 
Table 10. Coefficients of Gini when aged 18-25 for justify-govbenefit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic -0.010 -0.009+ -0.011* -0.011** -0.011** -0.010+ 
 (-1.60) (-1.81) (-2.51) (-2.60) (-2.60) (-1.84) 
B + Macro -0.009 -0.007 -0.011+ -0.011+ -0.011+ -0.009 
 (-1.11) (-1.16) (-1.83) (-1.80) (-1.80) (-1.31) 
B + M + Year FE -0.009 -0.009 -0.013* -0.011+ -0.011+ -0.009 
 (-1.20) (-1.45) (-2.17) (-1.91) (-1.89) (-1.25) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
In sum, results for justify-govbenefit are quite inconclusive. Estimated coefficients display 
both positive and negative signs and mostly lack statistical significance. 
 
6.2. Justify-nofare 
The second proxy for a respondent’s civism deals with the illegal use of public 
transportation. Figure 6 shows the respective scatter-plot. This time, we find that the 
estimated coefficients for the contemporaneous level of inequality are mostly positive (Table 
11). Furthermore, the relation between justify-nofare and the Gini of net income is often 
statistically significant. However, in the one case where the sign of the coefficient is negative, 
the estimate is strongly significant. 
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Figure 6. Income inequality and justify-nofare across OECD-countries. 
 
 
Table 11. Coefficients of contemporaneous Gini for justify-nofare 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic -0.054** 0.052+ 0.052+ 0.047 0.044 0.082* 
 (-3.13) (1.66) (1.81) (1.50) (1.41) (2.38) 
B + Macro 0.003 0.055* 0.067*** 0.070*** 0.066** 0.067*** 
 (0.22) (2.21) (3.38) (3.40) (3.18) (3.93) 
B + M + Year FE 0.012 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.069** 0.066** 0.024 
 (0.66) (5.21) (5.18) (3.26) (3.22) (0.85) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The effect of inequality when aged eighteen to twenty-five is exhibited by Table 12. 
There is a mostly negative, but insignificant relation between the mean level of the Gini 
coefficient of net income while the respondent was young and justify-nofare.  
 
Table 12. Coefficients of Gini when aged 18-25 for justify-nofare 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic -0.009 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 
 (-1.23) (-0.65) (-0.59) (-0.52) (-0.50) (-0.33) 
B + Macro 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.05) (-0.33) (-0.65) (-0.54) (-0.56) (-0.13) 
B + M + Year FE 0.000 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.06) (-0.54) (-0.76) (-0.73) (-0.73) (-0.33) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
In sum, there is a mostly positive relationship between contemporary levels of inequality 
and a civic attitude towards paying for public transport. However, a mostly negative effect of 
income inequality is found if the inequality experienced when young is employed as a 
regressor. 
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6.3. Justify-taxcheat 
The third proxy for civic virtue is constructed from the survey question about cheating on 
taxes. Average values of justify-taxcheat and the Gini of net incomes are depicted in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Income inequality and justify-taxcheat across OECD-countries. 
 
 
Results for the effect of income inequality are exhibited in Tables 13 and 14. For 
contemporary measures of income inequality, a mostly positive coefficient is obtained. All 
results for the configuration with macroeconomic controls without year fixed effects are 
statistically significant. Higher income inequality seemingly results in stronger tax morals. 
 
Table 13. Coefficients of contemporaneous Gini for justify-taxcheat 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic -0.007 0.045 0.042 0.039 0.037 0.051 
 (-0.31) (1.42) (1.38) (1.16) (1.10) (1.36) 
B + Macro 0.026+ 0.071** 0.073** 0.062** 0.060** 0.073* 
 (1.82) (3.10) (3.24) (2.89) (2.67) (2.37) 
B + M + Year FE -0.000 0.046* 0.039+ 0.033 0.029 0.046 
 (-0.03) (2.03) (1.81) (1.48) (1.28) (1.23) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
The average inequality level while being aged eighteen to twenty five does not exhibit a 
clear relation with tax morale. The estimated coefficients are sometimes positive and 
sometimes negative and fail to be statistically significant in all but one regression. 
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Table 14. Coefficients of Gini when aged 18-25 for justify-taxcheat 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic 0.009* 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.001 
 (1.99) (1.29) (1.06) (0.77) (0.86) (0.19) 
B + Macro 0.006 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 
 (1.16) (0.51) (0.19) (-0.26) (-0.25) (-1.09) 
B + M + Year FE 0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 (1.08) (-0.14) (-0.65) (-0.56) (-0.55) (-0.77) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
6.4. Justify-bribe 
The last proxy for civic values is the justifiability of accepting bribes. The average levels 
of this value and income inequality across countries are depicted in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Income inequality and justify-bribe across OECD-countries. 
 
 
Results about the effect from contemporaneous inequality in Table 15 show a negative 
relation with justify-bribe, albeit with very little statistical significance. If anything, growing 
income disparities seem to be harmful for civic virtues in this case. 
 
Table 15. Coefficients of contemporaneous Gini for justify-bribe 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.010 -0.012 -0.018 
 (-0.21) (-0.15) (-0.10) (-0.45) (-0.53) (-0.67) 
B + Macro 0.007 -0.016 -0.009 -0.018 -0.021 -0.023 
 (0.38) (-0.50) (-0.33) (-0.65) (-0.73) (-0.77) 
B + M + Year FE -0.016 -0.043 -0.056 -0.064+ -0.068+ -0.052 
 (-0.93) (-1.20) (-1.60) (-1.76) (-1.86) (-0.79) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Inequality experienced when young consistently reveals a negative relation between 
justify-bribe and the Gini coefficient (Table 16). For most estimates, the effect is statistically 
significant. This is quite in line with the effect from contemporaneous inequality levels.  
 
Table 16. Coefficients of Gini when aged 18-25 for justify-bribe 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic -0.010* -0.013* -0.016** -0.014** -0.014** -0.013* 
 (-2.06) (-2.42) (-2.95) (-2.64) (-2.60) (-2.32) 
B + Macro -0.009 -0.012+ -0.017* -0.014* -0.014* -0.015* 
 (-1.61) (-1.87) (-2.53) (-2.15) (-2.15) (-2.17) 
B + M + Year FE -0.009+ -0.013* -0.017** -0.014* -0.014* -0.013* 
 (-1.79) (-2.10) (-2.70) (-2.35) (-2.33) (-2.04) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
To summarize the results from this section, how civism is proxied matters a lot for the 
estimation results. Using a survey question about free riding on public transport suggests that 
income inequality might foster civic virtues, whereas using a question about corruption and 
bribes indicates that more inequality tends to have a negative effect. However, even the 
results from single proxies are shaky and do not allow to draw firm conclusions. We conclude 
that on the basis of the data at hand, income inequality is unlikely to be a major determinant 
of civism. 
 
7. Obedience 
Obedience presupposes an authority relation. Obedience is stressed in an individual’s 
value system if the individual attaches importance to executing the orders received from a 
higher level in the relevant hierarchy, e.g. a child obeying his parents, an employee obeying 
the employer, a common soldier obeying an officer. When obedience carries a symbolic 
value, the individual feels guilty if he does not follow his superiors’ instructions – 
independently of the content of the orders. 
The implications of a taste for obedience for economic performance are varied. Obedient 
workers make firms more flexible since the firm can re-direct the activity of its workers as 
required by transitory changes in production or market conditions. Thus, for given contractual 
arrangements between the firm and its employees, more obedience is predicted to reduce 
production costs. At the aggregate level, a higher output level may obtain from a given 
employment level. 
However, being very obedient entails the risk of being exploited. If an employment 
contract is very incomplete, i.e. it only loosely specifies the employee’s tasks, and assigns 
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authority to the employer, the latter has an incentive to use his authority to extract as much 
labor as possible from the employee. Anticipating this, a very obedient worker has an interest 
to sign an employment contract where his tasks are rigidly defined so as to avoid being 
exploited ex post. In situations where - because of market conditions or institutions - the 
bargaining power of workers is very low, this will not materialize and the firms will profit 
from an addomesticated, obedient, workforce. If instead workers have enough bargaining 
power, more respect for authority will come along with contractual arrangements that protect 
them from ex-post exploitation. The ensuing rigidity will tend to reduce firms’ productivity. 
So, more obedient individuals need not be good for the macroeconomy. 
There are two survey questions in the WVS that can be used to proxy an individual’s taste 
for obedience. Each item will now separately be presented and employed in a regression 
analysis.19 
 
7.1. Child-Obedience 
The first proxy for obedience is an element in a list of eleven non-cognitive child 
qualities, already used to capture a respondent’s work ethic, from which respondents can 
choose up to five. The survey question reads: 
 
Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if 
any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five.  
Obedience; 0 ’Not mentioned’ 1 ’Important’. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 9, the fraction of respondents which considers obedience an 
important child quality increases with a more uneven distribution of net incomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Inglehart and Welzel (2005) use similar data and interpret a taste for obedience as an element of traditional 
value systems as opposed to modern ones. See also Maystre et al. (2009), Berry et al. (2009), and Di Tella and 
Dubra (2010) for papers that employ similar items. 
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Figure 9. Income inequality and child-obedience across OECD-countries. 
 
 
Estimation results are exhibited in Tables 17 and 18. For the current Gini coefficients of 
net income there is a mostly positive association with obedience. In contrast, inequality levels 
when young mostly exhibit a negative relationship with obedience. Overall, the obtained 
results are rather inconclusive as the estimated coefficients are never statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
 
Table 17. Coefficients of contemporaneous Gini for child-obedience 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic -0.000 0.027 0.026 0.029 0.026 0.021 
 (-0.01) (0.98) (1.14) (1.28) (1.14) (0.79) 
B + Macro -0.022 0.035 0.035 0.011 0.010 0.011 
 (-1.04) (1.11) (1.24) (0.49) (0.46) (0.49) 
B + M + Year FE -0.008 0.042 0.026 0.010 0.010 0.065 
 (-0.36) (1.10) (0.74) (0.33) (0.32) (1.61) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 18. Coefficients of Gini when aged 18-25 for child-obedience 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.26) (-0.59) (-0.51) (-0.53) (-0.48) (0.08) 
B + Macro 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 
 (0.23) (-0.65) (-0.59) (-0.39) (-0.38) (-0.80) 
B + M + Year FE 0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.69) (-0.99) (-0.80) (-0.53) (-0.57) (-0.67) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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7.2. Instructions-follow  
The second proxy for the value attached to obedience is based on the following survey 
question: 
 
People have different ideas about following instructions at work. Some say that one 
should follow one’s superior’s instructions even when one does not fully agree with 
them. Others say that one should follow one’s superior’s instructions only when one is 
convinced that they are right. With which of these two opinions do you agree?  
1 ’Must be convinced first’ 2 ’Depends’ 3 ’Follow instructions’ 
 
Accordingly, an ordinal variable has been constructed that is called instructions-follow. 
That variable takes value three if the respondent answers “Fellow instructions”, two if 
respondent answers “Depends”, and one if the respondent answers “must be convinced 
first”.20 A higher value of the variable instructions-follow is therefore interpreted as a higher 
symbolic value attached to being obedient. As shown in Figure 10, instructions-follow is 
positively associated with income inequality across countries.  
 
Figure 10. Income inequality and instructions-follow across OECD-countries. 
 
 
Results about the effect from current inequality indicate that the Gini coefficient of net 
income has in very few cases a statistically significant, positive relation with instructions-
follow, see Table 19.  
                                                 
20 Estimations were also performed for a binary variable that assigns one to “Follow instructions” and zero 
otherwise and for a binary variable that assigns one to “Must be convinced first” and zero otherwise. Since 
results do not vary much from those from instructions-follow, they are not reported here for the sake of brevity. 
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Table 19. Coefficients of contemporaneous Gini for instructions-follow 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic 0.004 -0.001 -0.008 0.004 0.003 0.022 
 (0.33) (-0.04) (-0.23) (0.10) (0.07) (0.60) 
B + Macro -0.008 0.018 0.015 0.032 0.030 0.040 
 (-0.45) (0.57) (0.42) (0.80) (0.75) (1.08) 
B + M + Year FE -0.011 0.045* 0.043 0.048+ 0.045+ 0.022 
 (-0.65) (2.01) (1.63) (1.85) (1.75) (1.57) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
For inequality levels when young, there is also a positive association between the level of 
Gini coefficients and instructions-follow (Table 20). Estimated coefficients are always 
positive but they are statistically significant only for the basic configuration.  
 
Table 20. Coefficients of Gini when aged 18-25 for instructions-follow 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic 0.009** 0.007+ 0.008* 0.009* 0.009* 0.007 
 (2.72) (1.77) (2.02) (2.34) (2.47) (1.36) 
B + Macro 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 (0.96) (0.34) (0.72) (0.89) (1.13) (0.79) 
B + M + Year FE 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 
 (1.10) (0.23) (0.70) (0.70) (0.95) (0.69) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Taking our two proxies together, the degree of obedience in a society seems to have at 
best a weak correlation with income inequality. Higher levels of income inequality might 
make respondents less critical against the instructions of their superiors. However, there is no 
evidence of such an effect on the importance to teach obedience to children. Overall, the 
evidence is mixed, and the effect from inequality on the value of obedience is by no means 
robust. 
 
8. Honesty 
The symbolic value of honesty refers to the intrinsic importance attached to truth telling. 
People raised to be honest feel guilty when lying, whereas people who were differently raised 
do not care about telling lies. These latter individuals will lie more often if it is in their 
material interest to do so. In some instances, honesty and civism generate the same normative 
judgments. Thus, both valuing honesty and valuing civic virtues makes one refrain from 
declaring less than one’s true income for tax purposes. However, civism also refers to civic 
duties like voting, the violation of which does not entail that one behaves dishonestly. 
Moreover, honesty goes much beyond the behavior of the individual towards the polity as it 
also speaks of how individuals relate to other individuals or group of individuals. Thus, some 
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persons may be at the same time uncivic towards the polity and violate laws but quite honest 
when dealing with other persons in economic or social interactions. 
Honesty may substantially increase the propensity to conduct market transactions as it 
reduces the incidence of breach of contracts. The trustworthiness of a society of honest 
individuals enlarges the scope for labor division and exchange and thereby enhances the 
whole economy. Honesty also benefits collective decision making since it makes it possible to 
credibly transmit information that is useful for evaluating alternative policy options. As a 
result, one may presume that macroeconomic performance increases with the strength of the 
symbolic value associated to honesty.   
To measure the weight attached to honesty, we employ the following survey question: 
 
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. (Read out 
statements. Code one answer for each statement). Lying in your own interest  
1 ’Never justifiable’ 10 ’Always justifiable’ 21 
 
Figure 11. Income inequality and justify-lying across OECD-countries. 
 
 
The average values of honesty and income inequality across countries are depicted in 
Figure 11. Table 21 reports the estimated coefficients for the contemporaneous level of 
inequality. It shows that the Gini coefficient of net income has a mostly positive and in a few 
cases significant relation with the item measuring honesty. 
 
                                                 
21 This survey question among others has been used by Guiso et al. (2010) to construct a measure for civic 
capital. 
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Table 21. Coefficients of contemporaneous Gini for justify-lying 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic -0.018 0.020 0.025 0.028 0.028 0.018 
 (-1.34) (0.75) (0.82) (0.86) (0.81) (0.58) 
B + Macro 0.018 0.048** 0.056** 0.061* 0.061* 0.050* 
 (1.05) (2.84) (2.62) (2.44) (2.25) (2.18) 
B + M + Year FE 0.015 0.031 0.015 0.011 0.005 -0.000 
 (1.00) (1.05) (0.41) (0.29) (0.13) (-0.00) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
All estimated coefficients are negative if inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient 
experienced when young; however, those coefficients never reach statistical significance 
(Table 22). 
 
Table 22. Coefficients of Gini when aged 18-25 for justify-lying 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 
 (-0.62) (-0.71) (-0.51) (-0.83) (-0.77) (-0.61) 
B + Macro -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 
 (-0.28) (-0.71) (-0.81) (-1.24) (-1.19) (-1.06) 
B + M + Year FE -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 
 (-0.32) (-0.80) (-0.84) (-1.18) (-1.14) (-1.03) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
In sum, the taste for truth-telling exhibits a very weak and unstable correlation with 
income inequality. The data does not support the hypothesis that income inequality affects 
honesty in a significant way. 
 
9. Altruism 
An individual’s value system may stress the importance of helping others at personal cost 
when they are in need. We refer to this attitude as altruism. People who are intrinsically 
altruistic feel bad if they refrain from helping others. Conversely, selfish people do not 
experience any feeling of guilt in such cases. Altruism is differently explained depending on 
whether it refers to intra-family ties or to relationships between unrelated individuals. While 
there is substantial agreement that altruism towards own children and other relatives has a 
strong basis in natural selection and may somehow be hardwired in the human brain, altruism 
towards strangers is hard to explain on the basis of natural selection and should mainly be 
apprehended as a cultural phenomenon. 
The economic implications of altruism are complex. In a direct way, altruism entails 
transfers from the well-to-do to the needy and therefore tends to raise social welfare. This 
does not mean that economic performance as measured by GDP has to increase. If highly 
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productive individuals reduce their working hours in order to volunteer assisting people with 
social problems, GDP may go down. Furthermore, altruism may engender a Samaritan’s 
problem: the presence of altruists may encourage opportunistic behavior by those who expect 
to be helped by the altruists. Similarly to extensive welfare arrangements, in an altruistic 
society some subgroups may remain in a poverty trap because they face no incentive to invest 
if they get rescued anyway from the altruists. Thus, while altruism may make social 
interactions more pleasant and be useful as an insurance mechanism, it could possibly worsen 
macroeconomic performance as usually measured. 
In our dataset, unselfishness is an element in a list of eleven qualities from which 
respondents can choose up to five. The survey question reads: 
 
Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if 
any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five.  
Unselfishness; 0 ’Not mentioned’ 1 ’Important’.22 
 
 Figure 12. Income inequality and child-unselfish across OECD-countries. 
 
 
In Figure 12 the average fractions of respondents who find altruism an important child 
quality are plotted against the Gini coefficient of net incomes. As can be observed in Table 
23, results from contemporaneous inequality exhibit mostly positive coefficients. However, 
those coefficients are almost never statistically significant at conventional levels. 
 
                                                 
22 Aghion et al. (2010) employ this question to construct an index of civic education. Gorodnichenko and Roland 
(2011) employ it to build an index of the propensity to contribute to the provision of public goods. See also 
Maystre et al. (2009). 
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Table 23. Coefficients of contemporaneous Gini for child-unselfish 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic 0.047+ 0.014 0.007 0.014 0.013 0.033 
 (1.93) (0.67) (0.34) (0.58) (0.53) (0.99) 
B + Macro 0.004 0.017 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.037 
 (0.24) (0.73) (0.33) (0.20) (0.12) (0.84) 
B + M + Year FE -0.013 0.018 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.038 
 (-0.54) (0.50) (0.25) (0.10) (0.10) (0.83) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The average level of the Gini coefficient during youth shows a consistent negative 
relation with the current measure of altruism (Table 24). However, the estimated coefficients 
are insignificantly different from zero. 
 
Table 24. Coefficients of Gini when aged 18-25 for child-unselfish 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic 0.000 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.03) (-1.43) (-0.81) (-0.88) (-0.89) (-0.97) 
B + Macro -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 
 (-1.64) (-1.31) (-0.72) (-0.72) (-0.70) (-1.15) 
B + M + Year FE -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 
 (-1.27) (-0.81) (-0.39) (-0.38) (-0.37) (-0.87) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Overall, estimation results are ambiguous and statistical relations are mostly insignificant. 
The data does not support the hypothesis that income inequality affects altruism in a 
significant way. 
 
10. Tolerance 
Tolerance implies respect for diversity. Tolerant people who belong to a majority group 
feel a duty of treating minority members (e.g. immigrants and homosexuals) in a fair way, i.e. 
as if they were treating other majority individuals. As pointed out by Corneo and Jeanne 
(2009), tolerance can be usefully interpreted as a characteristic of an individual’s value 
system, rather than the evaluation of a special class of actions. A person can be seen as 
tolerant if she attaches symbolic value not only to her own characteristics but also to those 
that others have. Conversely, an intolerant person is complacent and disrespectful of traits and 
lifestyles that are not like hers. Thus, tolerance can be defined both for persons who are in the 
majority group and for persons who belong to a minority group. 
 Tolerance is likely to promote peaceful coexistence between diverse groups and to favor 
the manifestation of individual proclivities. Both effects are likely to be beneficial for 
macroeconomic performance since tolerance towards, say, different ethnicities, facilitates 
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cooperation in firms and markets, and acceptance of individuality favors the development of 
talents and therefore the generation of innovations that may eventually fuel economic growth. 
However, tolerance may also contribute to the erosion of social norms that are good for the 
economy. Increased tolerance may imply that there is less social stigmatization of 
uncooperative or even criminal behavior, e.g. pretending of being sick so as to keep receiving 
one’s wage without having to work for it. In such cases, more tolerant values may encourage 
the violation of norms of cooperation and harm the economy. Thus, the overall effect of 
tolerance on macroeconomic performance is a priori ambiguous. 
In our dataset, tolerance is an element in a list of eleven qualities from which respondents 
can choose up to five. The survey question is the one already used above and it reads: 
 
Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if 
any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five.  
Tolerance; 0 ’Not mentioned’ 1 ’Important’.23 
 
The observed combination of average tolerance and average income inequality across 
countries is shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13. Income inequality and child-tolerance across OECD-countries. 
 
 
As shown by Table 25, if one controls for more individual characteristics than gender and 
age, there is an overwhelmingly negative association between the current Gini coefficient of 
                                                 
23 This survey question has been used by Aghion et al. (2010) to construct a measure of civic education and by 
Tabellini (2007) to construct a measure of morality. See also Balan and Knack (2011), Dobler (2009), 
Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011), and Maystre et al. (2009). 
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the income distribution and the probability that a respondent finds it important to teach their 
children the value of tolerance. In a few regressions, the effect from inequality is statistically 
significant at conventional levels. 
 
Table 25. Coefficients of contemporaneous Gini for child-tolerance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic 0.060* -0.029 -0.028 -0.032 -0.030 -0.077* 
 (2.08) (-0.82) (-0.72) (-0.78) (-0.74) (-2.47) 
B + Macro 0.023 -0.007 -0.003 -0.018 -0.016 -0.073+ 
 (0.72) (-0.18) (-0.08) (-0.41) (-0.37) (-1.79) 
B + M + Year FE 0.009 -0.058** -0.078*** -0.067** -0.067** -0.023 
 (0.33) (-2.65) (-3.57) (-3.15) (-3.08) (-0.79) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 26 reports our results on the effect produced by the experience of inequality during 
youth. In this case, income inequality systematically entertains a negative relation with child-
tolerance. The estimated coefficients are sometimes significant. 
 
Table 26. Coefficients of Gini when aged 18-25 for child-tolerance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Basic -0.003 -0.009+ -0.010+ -0.009+ -0.008 -0.008 
 (-0.32) (-1.91) (-1.94) (-1.73) (-1.52) (-1.19) 
B + Macro -0.012** -0.009+ -0.010+ -0.009+ -0.008 -0.009 
 (-2.59) (-1.75) (-1.85) (-1.72) (-1.44) (-1.01) 
B + M + Year FE -0.010* -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.007 -0.005 
 (-2.29) (-1.46) (-1.64) (-1.60) (-1.36) (-0.65) 
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
All in all, higher levels of income inequality seem to reduce tolerance. Comparing 
tolerance with the dimensions of value systems investigated in the previous sections shows 
that the evidence in support of a cultural effect of inequality is stronger than in the cases of 
civism, obedience, honesty, and altruism. However, the evidence concerning the effect on 
tolerance is not as strong as the one concerning the effect on the work ethic. 
 
11.  Concluding Discussion 
 
This study has exploited attitudinal data from the WVS to explore the effect of income 
inequality on the dynamics of value systems. Six dimensions of value systems have been 
investigated: work ethic, civism, obedience, honesty, altruism, and tolerance. Results from a 
large number of regressions do not indicate that income inequality, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient of net household income, is a universal and important determinant of how values 
evolve. Thus, if income inequality affects outcomes, it seems to do so mainly through its 
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effect on the budget constraints faced by households. However, we have also found that the 
evolution of inequality can contribute to explain value change in an important case. 
 Specifically, estimation results about civism substantially vary with the proxy that one 
uses to measure the subjective importance attributed to civic virtues. No systematic regularity 
could be detected in the relationship between altruism and inequality. The same applies to 
honesty. There is some weak evidence that the taste for obedience tends to increase with 
increasing inequality of net incomes, but this only applies to one of two employed proxies. 
Income inequality seems also to decrease the tolerance of the population, but only in the 
sense that individuals who experienced more inequality when young tend to have a less 
tolerant attitude.  
The only robust finding of an effect of income inequality on values concerns the work 
ethic. We find that an increase of income disparities tends to be associated with a stronger 
work ethic, and this holds true for all four proxies employed in this investigation. The 
strongest effect refers to the one from the within-country variation in income inequality on the 
work ethic reported by individuals in the same country. Inequality experienced during youth 
also has a positive effect on the self-reported work ethic, but the evidence on that effect is 
weaker. 
Thus, our main empirical finding suggests that income inequality generates work 
incentives not only through pay differentials – the material reward of hard working – but also 
through esteem differentials – the symbolic reward of hard working. As pointed out above, 
the economic implications of a stronger emphasis on hard work are a priori ambiguous. 
Existing evidence suggests that a stronger work ethic may improve economic performance if 
the work ethic is weak and may worsen economic performance if the work ethic is already 
strong. 
A few qualifications are in order. The measures of values employed in this paper capture 
only some aspects of the values we are interested in and suffer from the usual limitations of 
attitudinal survey-based data. Furthermore, caution is needed because of well-known 
problems of comparability of inequality measures over time and across countries. These 
caveats notwithstanding, our finding that a growing income inequality contributes to explain a 
stronger work ethic endorsed by individuals has survived a number of robustness checks. 
Therefore, it may merit an in-depth theoretical and empirical analysis so as to identify the 
precise mechanisms behind the relationship between income inequality and work ethic. While 
such an analysis is beyond the scope of the current paper, we close with two remarks about 
the possible origin of that relationship and its implications.  
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First, one may use the modeling approach sketched in Section 2 to explain how income 
inequality may bring about value systems that put more emphasis on hard work. That 
theoretical framework suggests that a stronger work ethic may result from purposive value 
formation to achieve a high level of self-esteem. A natural interpretation of why a more 
unequal income distribution would make emphasis on hard work more valuable in order to 
secure self-esteem is that an increased income inequality ex post usually means an increased 
income uncertainty ex ante. While individual income has a large random component, work 
effort can often be controlled by individuals. Thus, in an economy with large income 
disparities it is difficult to predict one’s income level, but one can be rather sure that one will 
be a hard working person if a strong work ethic was instilled. In analogy with portfolio 
theory, the increased uncertainty about individual income may make families shift symbolic 
value from being economically successful to being laborious, so as to secure at least some 
minimal level of self-esteem for their members.   
Second, there is an interesting implication of the effect of income inequality on the work 
ethic, namely that it may be self-reinforcing in some circumstances. A stronger emphasis on 
hard work increases individual and aggregate labor supply, thereby reducing the price of labor 
relative to the price of capital. Since capital income generates a larger share of the income of 
households in the top fractiles of the income distribution than in the remaining quantiles, that 
change in factor prices may further increase income inequality. In that case, inequality may 
keep growing and, since value change is a slow-moving process, the inequality increase may 
be long-lived. 
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Appendix A: Means of self-reported values by country and wave 
 
 
Table A1. Mean of work-first by country and wave. 
Country 4 5 6 Total 
     
Australia . 2.628 . 2.628 
Austria . . 3.415 3.415 
Belgium 2.825 . 2.854 2.838 
Canada 3.138 2.803 . 2.962 
Chile 3.375 3.478 . 3.422 
Czech Republic 3.464 . 3.374 3.420 
Denmark 3.249 . 3.249 3.249 
Estonia 3.221 . 3.070 3.128 
Finland 2.939 2.929 2.719 2.859 
France 2.755 . 2.944 2.846 
Germany 3.465 3.679 3.576 3.574 
Greece 2.989 . 3.522 3.293 
Hungary 4.093 . 3.641 3.820 
Iceland 2.830 . 2.636 2.742 
Ireland 2.913 . 3.045 2.978 
Israel 3.887 . . 3.887 
Italy 3.294 3.337 3.230 3.282 
Japan 2.644 2.749 . 2.691 
Korea 3.019 3.143 . 3.081 
Luxembourg 2.962 . 3.164 3.078 
Mexico 3.678 3.432 . 3.553 
Netherlands 2.481 . 2.779 2.661 
New Zealand . . . . 
Norway . 3.179 3.147 3.163 
Poland 3.709 3.589 3.077 3.413 
Portugal 3.119 . 3.534 3.372 
Slovakia 3.639 . 3.718 3.681 
Slovenia 3.445 3.347 3.258 3.340 
Spain 3.289 3.233 3.337 3.290 
Sweden 2.720 2.870 3.007 2.833 
Switzerland . 3.214 3.123 3.168 
Turkey 3.791 3.781 4.008 3.890 
UK 2.631 . 2.890 2.788 
USA 2.907 2.847 . 2.876 
     
Total 3.188 3.192 3.257 3.215 
 
 
Table A2. Mean of money-work by country and wave 
country 4 5 6 Total 
     
Australia . 3.283 . 3.283 
Austria . . 3.365 3.365 
Belgium 3.070 . 3.086 3.077 
Canada 3.306 3.150 . 3.224 
Chile 3.681 3.489 . 3.594 
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Czech Republic 3.326 . 3.402 3.363 
Denmark 2.888 . 2.771 2.818 
Estonia 3.390 . 3.487 3.449 
Finland 3.084 3.105 3.080 3.089 
France 3.093 . 3.151 3.121 
Germany 3.011 3.143 3.420 3.192 
Greece 3.531 . 3.776 3.670 
Hungary 3.484 . 3.544 3.521 
Iceland 3.090 . 2.910 3.008 
Ireland 3.248 . 3.419 3.332 
Israel 3.710 . . 3.710 
Italy 3.807 3.663 3.762 3.759 
Japan 3.380 3.367 . 3.374 
Korea 3.793 3.649 . 3.720 
Luxembourg 3.453 . 3.509 3.485 
Mexico 3.344 3.255 . 3.299 
Netherlands 2.643 . 2.952 2.830 
New Zealand . . . . 
Norway . 3.356 3.216 3.286 
Poland 3.719 3.596 3.356 3.533 
Portugal 3.427 . 3.698 3.592 
Slovakia 3.474 . 3.465 3.470 
Slovenia 3.453 3.284 3.320 3.348 
Spain 3.210 3.142 2.963 3.121 
Sweden 3.038 2.893 3.176 3.039 
Switzerland . 3.209 3.024 3.116 
Turkey 4.242 4.270 4.292 4.273 
UK 3.017 . 3.248 3.157 
USA 3.023 3.287 . 3.157 
     
Total 3.334 3.348 3.372 3.351 
 
 
Table A3. Mean of work-duty by country and wave. 
country 4 5 6 Total 
     
Australia . 3.491 . 3.491 
Austria . . 3.888 3.888 
Belgium 3.581 . 3.848 3.700 
Canada 3.622 3.623 . 3.623 
Chile 3.807 3.964 . 3.879 
Czech Republic 3.645 . 3.499 3.575 
Denmark 3.750 . 3.991 3.895 
Estonia 3.505 . 3.480 3.489 
Finland 3.486 3.643 3.503 3.543 
France 3.455 . 3.858 3.649 
Germany 3.576 3.749 3.762 3.696 
Greece 3.320 . 3.738 3.559 
Hungary 3.830 . 3.788 3.804 
Iceland 3.435 . 3.411 3.424 
Ireland 3.538 . 3.753 3.644 
Israel 3.913 . . 3.913 
Italy 3.760 3.802 3.826 3.791 
Japan 3.640 3.726 . 3.679 
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Korea 3.666 3.723 . 3.695 
Luxembourg 3.803 . 4.066 3.955 
Mexico 3.876 3.953 . 3.916 
Netherlands 3.387 . 3.731 3.596 
New Zealand . . . . 
Norway . 4.082 4.211 4.146 
Poland 3.930 3.792 3.328 3.642 
Portugal 4.143 . 4.117 4.127 
Slovakia 3.682 . 3.680 3.681 
Slovenia 3.934 3.924 3.875 3.907 
Spain 3.598 3.703 3.628 3.632 
Sweden 3.456 3.536 3.660 3.529 
Switzerland . 3.710 3.784 3.747 
Turkey 4.284 4.208 4.225 4.235 
UK 3.290 . 3.696 3.537 
USA 3.474 3.522 . 3.498 
     
Total 3.660 3.766 3.788 3.731 
 
 
Table A4. Mean of child-hardwork by country and wave. 
country 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
        
Australia 0.119 . 0.359 . 0.477 . 0.332 
Austria . 0.143 . 0.090 . 0.129 0.120 
Belgium 0.325 0.343 . 0.425 . 0.367 0.367 
Canada 0.202 0.350 . 0.506 0.526 . 0.420 
Chile . 0.120 0.166 0.256 0.258 . 0.194 
Czech Republic . 0.838 0.789 0.739 . 0.740 0.785 
Denmark 0.021 0.024 . 0.021 . 0.045 0.029 
Estonia . 0.920 0.871 0.812 . 0.828 0.854 
Finland . 0.059 0.147 0.115 0.153 0.076 0.114 
France 0.334 0.529 . 0.504 0.623 0.489 0.491 
Germany . 0.149 0.099 0.226 0.275 0.171 0.180 
Greece . . . 0.313 . 0.289 0.300 
Hungary 0.285 0.704 0.337 0.714 . 0.759 0.569 
Iceland 0.239 0.779 . 0.443 . 0.456 0.460 
Ireland 0.235 0.276 . 0.365 . 0.601 0.346 
Israel . . . 0.242 . . 0.242 
Italy 0.128 0.236 . 0.361 0.393 0.388 0.298 
Japan 0.154 0.306 0.244 0.271 0.324 . 0.258 
Korea 0.400 0.643 0.622 0.716 0.727 . 0.630 
Luxembourg . . . 0.572 . 0.511 0.537 
Mexico . 0.233 0.360 0.287 0.243 . 0.290 
Netherlands 0.118 0.138 . 0.137 0.294 0.210 0.181 
New Zealand . . 0.372 . 0.407 . 0.387 
Norway 0.038 0.066 0.107 . 0.127 0.113 0.089 
Poland . 0.867 0.160 0.864 0.211 0.826 0.597 
Portugal . 0.691 . 0.672 . 0.695 0.687 
Slovakia . 0.831 0.703 0.753 . 0.859 0.794 
Slovenia . 0.320 0.329 0.292 0.338 0.325 0.321 
Spain 0.405 0.367 0.644 0.451 0.626 0.206 0.421 
Sweden 0.038 0.052 0.066 0.041 0.102 0.095 0.063 
Switzerland . 0.375 0.431 . 0.266 0.258 0.333 
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Turkey . 0.725 0.616 0.724 0.787 . 0.758 
UK 0.149 0.282 0.371 0.378 0.443 0.442 0.344 
USA 0.263 0.489 0.534 0.596 0.616 . 0.468 
        
Total 0.217 0.402 0.397 0.444 0.400 0.447 0.398 
 
 
Table A5. Mean of justify-govbenefit by country and wave. 
country 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
        
Australia 9.206 . 9.294 . 9.246 . 9.257 
Austria . 9.343 . 8.908 . 8.505 8.915 
Belgium 8.879 8.381 . 8.451 . 8.916 8.585 
Canada 8.573 9.112 . 9.120 9.134 . 9.025 
Chile . 6.941 7.645 7.669 6.778 . 7.244 
Czech Republic . 7.188 8.207 9.194 . 8.626 8.145 
Denmark 9.644 9.520 . 9.619 . 9.624 9.606 
Estonia . 8.719 8.828 7.801 . 8.388 8.430 
Finland . 6.258 8.976 8.653 8.927 9.119 8.608 
France 7.567 7.533 . 7.621 7.848 7.366 7.572 
Germany . 9.062 8.787 9.002 8.878 8.960 8.953 
Greece . . . 6.964 . 6.879 6.915 
Hungary 9.467 8.191 8.239 9.359 . 9.414 9.070 
Iceland 9.335 9.228 . 9.248 . 9.501 9.328 
Ireland 9.133 9.061 . 9.171 . 8.976 9.088 
Israel . . . . . . . 
Italy 9.533 8.924 . 9.118 9.383 9.166 9.182 
Japan 9.088 9.012 8.914 8.908 8.910 . 8.963 
Korea 8.888 8.797 . . 8.366 . 8.668 
Luxembourg . . . 8.131 . 7.898 7.997 
Mexico . 6.076 7.699 7.283 6.906 . 7.076 
Netherlands 9.540 9.389 . 9.512 9.536 9.520 9.503 
New Zealand . . 9.132 . 9.147 . 9.138 
Norway 9.579 9.567 9.362 . 8.936 9.093 9.320 
Poland . 8.874 8.705 8.638 8.684 8.198 8.626 
Portugal . 8.201 . 8.946 . 8.901 8.690 
Slovakia . 6.998 7.718 8.090 . 8.065 7.693 
Slovenia . 8.192 7.620 8.180 7.996 8.405 8.100 
Spain 8.647 8.425 9.078 8.617 8.473 8.334 8.556 
Sweden 9.569 9.372 8.848 8.919 9.129 9.061 9.113 
Switzerland . 9.082 8.669 . 9.417 9.262 9.112 
Turkey . 9.477 . 9.761 9.394 9.628 9.575 
UK 9.175 9.177 . 9.027 8.837 9.445 9.164 
USA 9.267 9.057 9.374 8.831 8.818 . 9.108 
        
Total 9.108 8.500 8.636 8.683 8.721 8.764 8.704 
 
 
Table A6. Mean of justify-nofare by country and wave. 
country 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
        
Australia 8.635 . 8.922 . 8.665 . 8.770 
Austria . 9.131 . 8.739 . 8.126 8.661 
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Belgium 8.834 8.541 . 8.608 . 8.528 8.599 
Canada 8.656 8.874 . 8.770 8.778 . 8.778 
Chile . 7.857 8.374 7.578 7.163 . 7.752 
Czech Republic . 8.875 7.794 8.048 . 7.830 8.204 
Denmark 9.223 9.244 . 9.228 . 9.143 9.203 
Estonia . 8.716 7.974 . . 8.623 8.465 
Finland . 8.782 8.692 8.502 8.723 8.379 8.596 
France 8.338 8.376 . 8.324 8.158 8.490 8.348 
Germany . 8.922 7.888 9.043 8.780 8.594 8.679 
Greece . . . 7.567 . 8.515 8.114 
Hungary 9.309 7.718 7.230 . . 8.249 8.325 
Iceland 8.647 8.149 . . . 8.276 8.380 
Ireland 8.440 8.762 . . . 8.062 8.428 
Israel . . . . . . . 
Italy 9.207 8.906 . 8.832 8.906 8.678 8.895 
Japan 9.406 9.476 9.438 9.377 9.419 . 9.420 
Korea 8.923 8.229 8.357 8.254 8.211 . 8.370 
Luxembourg . . . 8.340 . 8.210 8.265 
Mexico . 6.796 7.641 7.208 6.687 . 7.146 
Netherlands 8.540 8.767 . 8.236 8.982 8.622 8.629 
New Zealand . . 8.953 . 8.941 . 8.948 
Norway 9.449 9.300 9.066 . 8.716 8.732 9.064 
Poland . 9.124 9.035 . 8.502 8.019 8.615 
Portugal . 8.134 . . . 8.986 8.618 
Slovakia . 8.232 7.388 . . 7.808 7.813 
Slovenia . 8.504 8.246 . 7.779 8.632 8.322 
Spain 8.541 8.652 9.034 8.778 8.594 8.071 8.602 
Sweden 9.395 9.014 8.115 . 8.269 7.778 8.491 
Switzerland . 9.301 8.717 . 9.195 8.834 9.021 
Turkey . 9.040 . . 9.145 9.614 9.353 
UK 8.750 8.929 . 8.368 8.618 8.684 8.694 
USA 9.015 8.841 9.128 8.357 8.556 . 8.830 
        
Total 8.887 8.672 8.424 8.458 8.522 8.495 8.574 
 
 
Table A7. Mean of justify-taxcheat by country and wave. 
country 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
        
Australia 7.927 . 8.843 . 8.965 . 8.641 
Austria . 9.026 . 8.900 . 8.435 8.785 
Belgium 7.679 6.894 . 7.389 . 7.814 7.332 
Canada 8.756 8.600 . 8.984 9.186 . 8.911 
Chile . 9.139 8.834 8.831 9.045 . 8.976 
Czech Republic . 9.185 8.020 8.977 . 8.515 8.768 
Denmark 8.489 8.555 . 8.995 . 9.188 8.835 
Estonia . 8.920 7.627 7.824 . 8.723 8.327 
Finland . 7.843 8.433 8.454 8.858 9.072 8.603 
France 7.555 7.918 . 7.965 8.176 8.530 8.049 
Germany . 8.435 8.014 8.629 8.861 9.028 8.576 
Greece . . . 7.843 . 8.585 8.271 
Hungary . 7.907 8.598 8.915 . 9.369 8.793 
Iceland 8.467 8.447 . 8.773 . 9.024 8.683 
Ireland 7.623 8.259 . 8.710 . 8.684 8.286 
Israel . . . . . . . 
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Italy 9.094 8.466 . 8.608 8.824 8.746 8.708 
Japan 9.522 9.520 9.491 9.537 9.544 . 9.524 
Korea 9.444 9.453 9.213 9.409 9.336 . 9.367 
Luxembourg . . . 7.650 . 8.308 8.029 
Mexico . 7.199 7.918 8.693 8.375 . 8.029 
Netherlands 7.810 8.038 . 8.262 8.737 8.739 8.344 
New Zealand . . 8.698 . 8.835 . 8.757 
Norway 7.665 7.904 8.287 . 8.718 8.668 8.234 
Poland . 8.284 8.514 8.860 8.545 8.374 8.478 
Portugal . 7.182 . 8.564 . 8.855 8.247 
Slovakia . 8.873 7.740 8.852 . 8.669 8.561 
Slovenia . 8.971 8.185 8.663 8.630 9.015 8.714 
Spain 8.148 8.392 9.082 8.750 8.937 8.574 8.555 
Sweden 9.196 8.535 8.419 8.575 8.706 8.679 8.665 
Switzerland . 8.628 8.354 . 8.918 8.828 8.684 
Turkey . 9.755 . 9.820 9.661 9.713 9.730 
UK 8.171 8.476 . 8.569 8.709 9.158 8.643 
USA 8.880 9.052 9.316 8.777 9.045 . 9.011 
        
Total 8.402 8.437 8.492 8.643 8.908 8.789 8.615 
 
 
Table A8. Mean of justify-bribe by country and wave 
country 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
        
Australia 9.325 . 9.731 . 9.518 . 9.561 
Austria . 9.401 . 9.430 . 9.078 9.302 
Belgium 8.702 8.650 . 9.023 . 9.014 8.834 
Canada 9.340 9.384 . 9.449 9.454 . 9.416 
Chile . 9.547 9.333 8.950 9.296 . 9.296 
Czech Republic . 8.806 8.719 8.820 . 8.432 8.713 
Denmark 9.791 9.788 . 9.854 . 9.804 9.808 
Estonia . 9.072 9.493 9.074 . 9.479 9.304 
Finland . 9.431 9.587 9.560 9.402 9.722 9.553 
France 8.384 8.888 . 8.923 8.809 9.086 8.838 
Germany . 9.080 9.087 9.065 9.291 9.152 9.129 
Greece . . . 9.073 . 9.209 9.152 
Hungary 9.139 8.298 7.306 8.413 . 9.083 8.635 
Iceland 9.614 9.589 . 9.731 . 9.782 9.682 
Ireland 9.482 9.666 . 9.596 . 8.994 9.439 
Israel . . . 9.575 . . 9.575 
Italy 8.984 9.334 . 9.498 9.681 9.426 9.379 
Japan 9.126 9.211 9.421 9.472 9.460 . 9.345 
Korea 8.912 9.189 9.493 9.582 9.410 . 9.336 
Luxembourg . . . 9.177 . 9.282 9.238 
Mexico . 8.248 8.450 8.872 8.564 . 8.522 
Netherlands 8.990 9.215 . 9.436 9.448 9.527 9.333 
New Zealand . . 9.543 . 9.550 . 9.546 
Norway 9.651 9.541 9.679 . 9.481 9.590 9.589 
Poland . 9.441 9.630 9.474 9.615 8.925 9.391 
Portugal . 9.313 . 9.217 . 9.302 9.282 
Slovakia . 8.517 8.384 8.076 . 8.508 8.382 
Slovenia . 9.327 9.170 9.224 9.141 9.441 9.273 
Spain 9.418 9.522 9.581 9.346 9.181 9.504 9.441 
 45 
Sweden 9.400 9.363 9.205 9.149 9.016 8.936 9.169 
Switzerland . 9.407 9.412 . 9.481 9.474 9.443 
Turkey . 9.804 . 9.880 9.718 9.769 9.786 
UK 9.294 9.485 . 9.220 9.347 9.568 9.405 
USA 9.502 9.535 9.781 9.440 9.413 . 9.540 
        
Total 9.257 9.211 9.240 9.237 9.342 9.275 9.255 
 
 
Table A9. Mean of child-obedience by country and wave 
country 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
        
Australia 0.411 . 0.287 . 0.366 . 0.343 
Austria . 0.254 . 0.177 . 0.140 0.190 
Belgium 0.288 0.365 . 0.421 . 0.365 0.367 
Canada 0.210 0.282 . 0.311 0.313 . 0.287 
Chile . 0.522 0.458 0.551 0.518 . 0.515 
Czech Republic . 0.208 0.140 0.166 . 0.256 0.199 
Denmark 0.128 0.203 . 0.144 . 0.142 0.152 
Estonia . 0.188 0.270 0.283 . 0.275 0.256 
Finland . 0.256 0.281 0.298 0.330 0.202 0.274 
France 0.175 0.530 . 0.364 0.415 0.275 0.341 
Germany . 0.230 0.123 0.139 0.165 0.101 0.161 
Greece . . . 0.108 . 0.245 0.186 
Hungary 0.307 0.448 0.308 0.297 . 0.416 0.360 
Iceland 0.155 0.678 . 0.174 . 0.129 0.262 
Ireland 0.333 0.352 . 0.479 . 0.573 0.414 
Israel . . . 0.163 . . 0.163 
Italy 0.259 0.320 . 0.278 0.261 0.316 0.291 
Japan 0.061 0.101 0.063 0.043 0.051 . 0.062 
Korea 0.129 0.181 0.144 0.132 0.105 . 0.139 
Luxembourg . . . 0.266 . 0.293 0.282 
Mexico . 0.451 0.506 0.586 0.583 . 0.529 
Netherlands 0.232 0.330 . 0.254 0.413 0.293 0.301 
New Zealand . . 0.219 . 0.241 . 0.229 
Norway 0.256 0.313 0.259 . 0.287 0.195 0.264 
Poland . 0.420 0.487 0.346 0.486 0.316 0.406 
Portugal . 0.494 . 0.367 . 0.298 0.379 
Slovakia . 0.358 0.268 0.262 . 0.352 0.315 
Slovenia . 0.398 0.283 0.251 0.313 0.219 0.291 
Spain 0.294 0.419 0.438 0.488 0.369 0.291 0.392 
Sweden 0.133 0.249 0.159 0.122 0.162 0.163 0.159 
Switzerland . 0.210 0.262 . 0.206 0.147 0.206 
Turkey . 0.314 0.318 0.401 0.452 . 0.432 
UK 0.358 0.417 0.509 0.468 0.461 0.417 0.435 
USA 0.275 0.379 0.368 0.323 0.287 . 0.325 
        
Total 0.245 0.334 0.298 0.298 0.321 0.281 0.300 
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Table A10. Mean of instructions-follow by country and wave 
country 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
        
Australia . . 2.082 . . . 2.082 
Austria . 2.020 . 1.865 . 1.827 1.901 
Belgium 2.009 1.857 . 1.862 . 1.925 1.895 
Canada 2.222 2.239 . 2.269 2.018 . 2.177 
Chile . 1.923 1.980 2.243 . . 2.042 
Czech Republic . 1.666 1.996 1.966 . 1.967 1.924 
Denmark 2.368 1.817 . 2.093 . 2.109 2.102 
Estonia . 1.689 1.692 1.901 . 1.941 1.820 
Finland . 1.691 1.664 1.688 . 1.741 1.697 
France 1.634 1.882 . 1.928 . 1.872 1.837 
Germany . 2.140 1.668 2.133 . 2.056 2.020 
Greece . . . 1.947 . 2.047 2.004 
Hungary 2.213 1.690 2.107 2.083 . 1.999 2.025 
Iceland 2.033 2.049 . 2.097 . 1.969 2.039 
Ireland 2.196 2.057 . 2.017 . 2.034 2.082 
Israel . . . . . . . 
Italy 1.803 1.817 . 1.939 . 1.961 1.881 
Japan 2.265 2.218 . 2.195 . . 2.224 
Korea 1.925 1.610 1.818 1.988 . . 1.827 
Luxembourg . . . 1.989 . 2.025 2.010 
Mexico . 2.011 2.190 2.015 . . 2.091 
Netherlands 2.042 1.911 . 1.971 . 1.952 1.969 
New Zealand . . 2.115 . 2.076 . 2.098 
Norway 2.303 2.276 2.270 . . 2.252 2.275 
Poland . 1.618 . 1.784 . 1.832 1.757 
Portugal . 2.086 . 1.968 . 1.861 1.960 
Slovakia . 1.634 1.996 2.019 . 2.038 1.978 
Slovenia . 1.615 1.572 1.709 . 1.714 1.658 
Spain 1.863 1.812 1.855 1.986 . 1.876 1.871 
Sweden 2.079 2.025 2.295 2.037 . 2.032 2.083 
Switzerland . . 1.907 . . 1.943 1.925 
Turkey . 2.076 2.156 1.832 . 1.978 1.954 
UK 2.130 2.014 . 2.111 . 2.027 2.062 
USA 2.420 2.389 2.352 2.440 . . 2.400 
        
Total 2.101 1.947 1.998 1.994 2.035 1.959 1.990 
 
 
Table A11. Mean of justify-lying by country and wave 
country 1 2 4 6 Total 
      
Australia      
Austria . 8.266 7.925 7.781 7.988 
Belgium 7.645 7.055 7.385 7.346 7.290 
Canada 8.317 8.203 . . 8.251 
Chile . 8.652 . . 8.652 
Czech Republic . 7.730 8.217 7.839 7.897 
Denmark 8.864 8.913 9.016 8.963 8.939 
Estonia . 8.416 7.988 8.526 8.343 
Finland . 8.128 8.150 8.435 8.260 
France 7.488 7.258 7.326 7.878 7.507 
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Germany . 7.717 7.805 8.046 7.832 
Greece . . 7.896 8.540 8.268 
Hungary . 7.297 8.496 8.270 8.056 
Iceland 9.277 9.236 9.253 9.187 9.240 
Ireland 8.391 8.650 8.780 8.312 8.529 
Israel . . . . . 
Italy 8.920 8.258 8.587 8.815 8.605 
Japan . 8.747 . . 8.747 
Korea . 8.397 . . 8.397 
Luxembourg . . 7.806 7.972 7.902 
Mexico . 6.761 . . 6.761 
Netherlands 7.602 7.457 7.772 8.019 7.743 
New Zealand . . . . . 
Norway 9.131 9.003 . 8.699 8.949 
Poland . 8.769 8.951 7.955 8.547 
Portugal . 7.443 8.592 8.728 8.284 
Slovakia . 7.695 7.794 8.061 7.849 
Slovenia . 8.924 8.462 8.925 8.787 
Spain 7.747 7.976 8.065 7.821 7.905 
Sweden 8.898 8.909 8.370 7.838 8.482 
Switzerland . 8.358 . 8.239 8.301 
Turkey . . 9.588 9.504 9.533 
UK 8.070 8.222 8.028 8.614 8.268 
USA 8.456 8.641 . . 8.537 
      
Total 8.319 8.080 8.211 8.332 8.215 
 
 
Table A12. Mean of child-unselfish by country and wave. 
country 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
        
Australia 0.377 . 0.396 . 0.536 . 0.434 
Austria . 0.073 . 0.054 . 0.100 0.075 
Belgium 0.144 0.272 . 0.361 . 0.225 0.265 
Canada 0.204 0.423 . 0.456 0.464 . 0.406 
Chile . 0.079 0.257 0.347 0.326 . 0.238 
Czech Republic . 0.369 0.323 0.363 . 0.343 0.355 
Denmark 0.249 0.506 . 0.559 . 0.634 0.494 
Estonia . 0.249 0.168 0.164 . 0.158 0.182 
Finland . 0.211 0.182 0.218 0.303 0.280 0.242 
France 0.217 0.399 . 0.402 0.556 0.409 0.393 
Germany . 0.080 0.054 0.087 0.069 0.051 0.070 
Greece . . . 0.257 . 0.283 0.272 
Hungary 0.140 0.258 0.288 0.230 . 0.343 0.249 
Iceland 0.209 0.752 . 0.346 . 0.314 0.385 
Ireland 0.227 0.526 . 0.492 . 0.512 0.421 
Israel . . . 0.490 . . 0.490 
Italy 0.022 0.399 . 0.414 0.439 0.408 0.345 
Japan 0.281 0.440 0.378 0.532 0.503 . 0.429 
Korea 0.119 0.106 0.106 0.147 0.120 . 0.119 
Luxembourg . . . 0.266 . 0.323 0.298 
Mexico . 0.110 0.365 0.487 0.476 . 0.361 
Netherlands 0.090 0.222 . 0.279 0.235 0.227 0.208 
New Zealand . . 0.328 . 0.386 . 0.353 
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Norway 0.055 0.095 0.112 . 0.198 0.174 0.125 
Poland . 0.094 0.139 0.120 0.184 0.191 0.148 
Portugal . 0.302 . 0.402 . 0.389 0.365 
Slovakia . 0.223 0.189 0.186 . 0.264 0.218 
Slovenia . 0.331 0.293 0.376 0.380 0.310 0.337 
Spain 0.044 0.078 0.143 0.119 0.334 0.016 0.103 
Sweden 0.102 0.293 0.237 0.332 0.347 0.313 0.281 
Switzerland . 0.391 0.326 . 0.221 0.120 0.268 
Turkey . 0.278 0.227 0.234 0.320 . 0.293 
UK 0.406 0.566 . 0.602 0.547 0.499 0.522 
USA 0.188 0.368 0.348 0.391 0.400 . 0.321 
        
Total 0.175 0.266 0.247 0.311 0.346 0.292 0.279 
 
Table A13. Mean of child-tolerance by country and wave. 
country 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
        
Australia 0.671 . 0.809 . 0.916 . 0.805 
Austria . 0.661 . 0.716 . 0.687 0.689 
Belgium 0.453 0.675 . 0.846 . 0.822 0.715 
Canada 0.530 0.802 . 0.816 0.837 . 0.768 
Chile . 0.790 0.616 0.760 0.791 . 0.746 
Czech Republic . 0.661 0.600 0.632 . 0.501 0.609 
Denmark 0.584 0.809 . 0.873 . 0.867 0.785 
Estonia . 0.702 0.596 0.712 . 0.768 0.702 
Finland . 0.803 0.825 0.827 0.860 0.868 0.840 
France 0.589 0.783 . 0.847 0.869 0.871 0.797 
Germany . 0.760 0.883 0.707 0.732 0.730 0.762 
Greece . . . 0.525 . 0.536 0.531 
Hungary 0.307 0.617 0.635 0.665 . 0.708 0.572 
Iceland 0.580 0.930 . 0.843 . 0.861 0.794 
Ireland 0.560 0.764 . 0.765 . 0.742 0.698 
Israel . . . 0.819 . . 0.819 
Italy 0.433 0.670 . 0.750 0.739 0.711 0.667 
Japan 0.410 0.595 0.583 0.712 0.745 . 0.611 
Korea 0.249 0.554 0.468 0.647 0.560 . 0.506 
Luxembourg . . . 0.771 . 0.825 0.802 
Mexico . 0.643 0.573 0.718 0.781 . 0.667 
Netherlands 0.594 0.885 . 0.916 0.859 0.855 0.816 
New Zealand . . 0.779 . 0.825 . 0.799 
Norway 0.317 0.637 0.659 . 0.914 0.905 0.682 
Poland . 0.765 0.815 0.791 0.843 0.739 0.788 
Portugal . 0.678 . 0.667 . 0.678 0.675 
Slovakia . 0.552 0.571 0.571 . 0.516 0.551 
Slovenia . 0.745 0.720 0.701 0.750 0.720 0.727 
Spain 0.442 0.733 0.756 0.796 0.716 0.814 0.702 
Sweden 0.711 0.908 0.904 0.923 0.936 0.916 0.891 
Switzerland . 0.774 0.786 . 0.907 0.856 0.830 
Turkey . 0.691 0.613 0.623 0.692 . 0.676 
UK 0.619 0.796 0.861 0.830 0.854 0.794 0.790 
USA 0.524 0.726 0.749 0.798 0.790 . 0.693 
        
Total 0.500 0.719 0.707 0.745 0.802 0.761 0.717 
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Appendix B: Gini coefficients of equivalent net household incomes 
country 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
        
Australia 28.10 . 30.80 . 31.57 . 30.32 
Austria . 25.10 . 25.91 . 26.67 25.90 
Belgium 22.44 23.29 . 26.82 . . 24.28 
Canada 28.71 27.48 . 31.50 31.55 . 30.04 
Chile . 51.88 52.14 51.57 49.09 . 51.26 
Czech Republic . 21.18 25.30 25.24 . 25.27 23.69 
Denmark 27.22 25.91 . 22.39 . 24.98 25.18 
Estonia . 22.48 36.17 35.86 . 31.96 31.67 
Finland . 20.95 21.94 24.60 25.69 . 23.59 
France 28.80 27.12 . 26.75 27.94 28.00 27.68 
Germany . 26.55 26.28 26.51 28.53 29.96 27.45 
Greece . . . 33.56 . 33.53 33.54 
Hungary 22.08 32.30 28.85 29.20 . 27.67 27.45 
Iceland . . . . . 28.63 28.63 
Ireland 33.30 33.01 . 32.15 . 30.66 32.34 
Israel . . . 34.60 . . 34.60 
Italy 30.61 30.66 . 33.71 33.99 . 32.14 
Japan 25.20 28.03 29.08 32.82 35.88 . 30.27 
South Korea 36.07 31.97 29.01 32.25 31.84 . 32.05 
Luxembourg . . . 26.35 . 28.42 27.53 
Mexico . 47.24 47.70 49.10 46.05 . 47.54 
Netherlands 25.75 26.21 . 23.10 27.36 27.82 26.21 
New Zealand . . 36.40 . 32.92 . 34.87 
Norway 22.17 23.25 23.47 . 24.08 24.08 23.40 
Poland . 25.74 30.76 28.90 31.29 29.67 28.84 
Portugal . 31.01 . 35.43 . 35.90 34.22 
Slovakia . 17.64 23.76 23.71 . 22.99 21.77 
Slovenia . 21.79 24.43 24.90 24.50 25.37 24.26 
Spain 31.12 30.30 35.30 33.65 31.44 31.28 31.78 
Sweden 20.13 20.70 21.73 23.33 23.52 . 22.14 
Switzerland . 30.91 28.73 . . . 29.89 
Turkey . 43.68 43.41 43.54 . . 43.53 
United Kingdom 26.96 32.77 34.29 34.70 34.96 . 32.61 
USA 30.36 33.53 36.26 37.04 36.87 . 34.17 
        
Total 27.79 28.82 32.68 32.11 32.23 28.55 30.42 
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Appendix C: Control variables 
 
Due to different coding, the EVS 2008 wave had to be harmonized with the already 
harmonized 1980-2005 WVS data. The descriptive statistics of all control variables are 
summarized in Table C1. 
Respondents’ age is directly taken from the harmonized WVS data, but is calculated using the 
birth year for the EVS 2008. In the WVS data, income is coded in ten categories with 
different category boundaries for each country. In contrast, the EVS 2008 provides twelve 
income categories with the same categories for all countries. Income is harmonized by 
approximating income quintiles in each data set. The third quintile is used as reference 
category. The legal status is coded in four dummies, indicating single, married, divorced or 
widowed, with single being the reference category. To control for labor market status, eight 
dummies are used, capturing full and part time employment, self-employment, being retired, 
student, housewife, unemployed or other; full employment is used as the reference category. 
Religiosity is captured by dummies for the frequency of attendance to religious services. 
Town size is captured by eight dummies, and towns with less than 2,000 inhabitants is the 
reference category. 
 
Table C1. Summary statistics of micro control variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
female 196296 0.529 0.499 0 1 
age 192281 44.379 17.321 14 108 
age_sqr 192281 2269.536 1674.580 196 11664 
      
edu_no 131700 0.061 0.240 0 1 
edu_prime 131700 0.242 0.428 0 1 
edu_somesec 131700 0.230 0.421 0 1 
edu_sec 131700 0.303 0.459 0 1 
edu_uni 131700 0.161 0.368 0 1 
      
inc_quint1 170456 0.186 0.389 0 1 
inc_quint2 170456 0.272 0.445 0 1 
inc_quint3 170456 0.229 0.420 0 1 
inc_quint4 170456 0.168 0.374 0 1 
inc_quint5 170456 0.145 0.352 0 1 
      
stat_single 194392 0.232 0.422 0 1 
stat_married 194392 0.623 0.485 0 1 
stat_divorced 194392 0.068 0.252 0 1 
stat_widowed 194392 0.076 0.264 0 1 
      
jobstat_full 190515 0.413 0.492 0 1 
jobstat_part 190515 0.076 0.265 0 1 
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jobstat_self 190515 0.067 0.250 0 1 
jobstat_retired 190515 0.186 0.389 0 1 
jobstat_wife 190515 0.124 0.330 0 1 
jobstat_student 190515 0.059 0.236 0 1 
jobstat_unemp 190515 0.056 0.230 0 1 
jobstat_other 190515 0.019 0.136 0 1 
      
religion_none 188182 0.403 0.491 0 1 
religion_some 188182 0.271 0.444 0 1 
religion_reg 188182 0.326 0.469 0 1 
      
townsize_1 137667 0.176 0.381 0 1 
townsize_2 137667 0.098 0.297 0 1 
townsize_3 137667 0.090 0.286 0 1 
townsize_4 137667 0.101 0.302 0 1 
townsize_5 137667 0.131 0.337 0 1 
townsize_6 137667 0.099 0.298 0 1 
townsize_7 137667 0.157 0.364 0 1 
townsize_8 137667 0.143 0.350 0 1 
      
 
Macroeconomic control variables stem from both the OECD and the World Bank datasets, as 
displayed in Table C2. The results reported in this paper are based on OECD data. 
 
Table C2. Summary statistics of macro control variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
ln_pcgdp_oecd 190259 9.90 0.44 8.52 11.08 
ln_pcgdp_wdi 195360 10.00 0.45 8.72 11.20 
unemp_oecd 180103 7.39 3.88 0.46 22.96 
unemp_wdi 163559 7.46 3.78 0.60 22.70 
gdp_growth_oecd 176361 2.48 3.16 -11.61 10.65 
gdp_growth_wdi 193454 1.82 3.95 -14.57 10.65 
      
 
 
 
